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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to provide a systems perspective of the 
university-industry technology transfer (UITT) process. Departing from the 
traditional linear approach to technology transfer, we build a model capturing 
interactions between a selected number of technology transfer channels and 
variables endogenous to the technology transfer process. The relationships 
identified in the model demonstrate that the UITT process and its impact extend 
well beyond the traditional scope of the university technology transfer offices. 
A narrow view of the process, one focused on short-term revenue maximisation 
principles, is inadequate due to secondary system elements that can impact 
technology commercialisation outcomes. The model suggests, when deciding 
on licensing, consulting or collaborative research agreements, universities 
should account for their reputation for technology transfer and R&D as key 
assets. We show that a technology transfer policy that relaxes licensing terms in 
favour of industry can have multi-path positive feedbacks on university 
success. 
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1 Introduction 
According to the Association of University Technology Managers (2014), universities in 
the US spent $65.1 billion on research and development (R&D) in 2013, a 2.3% increase 
with respect to the previous year. The innovations created, added to universities 
portfolios of intellectual property (IP), yielded a total of 43,295 licenses and options in 
2013 (Association of University Technology Managers, 2014). The increasing number of 
technologies available for licensing is attractive to companies seeking to grow their 
product and service offerings. As more firms license innovations from universities, the 
interest in university innovation creation and technology transfer increases (Chesbrough, 
2006). This paints a very positive picture of the university technology licensing process, 
yet we do not see an unbounded year-to-year increase in privately sponsored research 
spurring university innovations or in the number of technologies licensed. 
Universities have undoubtedly identified licensing growth potential as important in 
their operations. A growing number of them now include technology transfer in their 
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mission, not only as stream of revenue, but also as a means to support their goals of 
educating people, conducting sponsored research, serving society andpromoting 
economic development (Carlsson and Fridh, 2002; Rasmussen et al., 2006). However, 
many universities still focus on the traditional linear model of technology transfer 
(Bradley et al., 2013), placing too much emphasis on patents and licensing revenue, while 
disregarding the impact of technology transfer reputation. Among other routes, 
universities have the opportunity to showcase their innovativeness, improve their 
reputation and attract more companies to licensing agreements after successful sponsored 
research collaborations. For example, in 2013, only $4.58 billion of the US universities 
R&D budgets (Association of University Technology Managers, 2014), approximately 
7%, originated from sponsored research. 
The value of the system dynamics approach we describe in this paper stems from the 
study of the inherent complexity of the university-industry technology transfer (UITT) 
process. Many studies have explored the linear aspects of the UITT process, including the 
presence of barriers to technology transfer and offered suggestions for improving it (e.g., 
Siegel et al., 2003a, 2003b; 2004; Swamidass and Vulasa, 2009; Thursby and Thursby, 
2002, 2003). However, from a policy perspective, models evaluating ex ante the effects 
of technology transfer policy and decisions have not been forthcoming. For executives at 
university technology transfer offices (TTOs), the key to sustainable success is not only 
identifying weaknesses in their existing policies and processes, but developing a deeper 
understanding of the dynamics associated with these policies and how particular policies 
and strategies influence the behaviour of the overall UITT system. If we adopt the 
perspective of a TTO, the question to address is: what additional TTO services and firms 
perceptual processes result in a successful technology transfer process? 
Using a qualitative system dynamics approach on UITT, we capture the complexity 
of this system and provide a holistic view for researchers and TTO management alike. 
We identify and model four interacting channels affecting the outcomes of the university 
technology-transfer process, namely: licensing, collaborative research, academic 
entrepreneurship and consulting. In addition, by applying a resource-based view of the 
UITT process, we account for factors such as the universities reputation. Industry 
perceptions of TTO flexibility and bureaucracy, which industry identifies as an issue and 
most TTO personnel fail to ascertain as relevant to successful UITT (Siegel et al., 2003a), 
are incorporated into our system dynamics model. Our hypothesis is that a TTO creating 
policy with the sole objective of short-term revenue maximisation will obtain sub-optimal 
returns. Furthermore, system dynamics modelling shifts the description of the UITT 
process from the current TTO focus on control, operating under the premises of agency 
theory (Eisenhardt, 1989), to a broader perspective incorporating implicit and explicit 
relationships with stakeholders (Hill and Jones, 1992). 
This paper marks a first step towards the comprehensive modelling and simulation of 
university technology transfer. Systems modelling, at this stage, is employed to establish 
a common understanding of the inner workings of the technology transfer process, 
preceding simulation experiments (Forrester, 2007; Pidd, 2009). With this goal in mind, 
we first provide an overview of the role of university TTOs, followed by an overview of 
our modelling approach. Then, we build and evaluate a comprehensive UITT model 
investigating the presence of reinforcing and balancing elements. To bring the manuscript 
to a close, we present a detailed discussion of the impact of alternative TTO policies and 
offer conclusions and directions for future research that supports the stakeholder-agency 
theory approach (Hill and Jones, 1992). 
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2 The role of TTOs 
There are three main parties involved in the university technology transfer process, 
namely: the university researcher, the university TTO acting as the contracting 
intermediary and the established company or entrepreneur licensing or commercialising 
the technology (Siegel et al., 2003a). Throughout this manuscript, our main focus is on 
the TTO. Most large US universities have well-established TTOs (Friedman and 
Silberman, 2003), yet their size and the scope of services they offer vary. In some cases, 
TTOs have been renamed using terms like offices of commercialisation, innovation, 
outreach, knowledge exchange, or industry engagement (Bradley et al., 2013). We use 
the name TTO throughout this paper as representative of all of these, although we 
acknowledge that the process is not a one-way transfer and there exists a capacity for 
bidirectional exchange of knowledge, information and technology between the university 
and its industry partners (Martinelli et al., 2008). 
Bercovitz et al. (2001) describe the main activities of TTOs as handling invention 
disclosures, licensing university IP and initiating collaborative research agreements. The 
first two activities are covered by the traditional linear model of technology transfer 
(Harmon et al., 1997). Figure 1 provides an overview of the different steps and 
stakeholders involved in the traditional linear model of technology transfer. 
Figure 1 Traditional linear model and stakeholder involvement 
 
Source: Siegel et al. (2003a) 
In the traditional linear theory, the process starts with a scientific discovery made by a 
researcher (Siegel et al., 2003b). The TTO relies on the researchers willingness to 
disclose their inventions, which is affected by the incentive structure defined by the 
university (Aldridge and Audretsch, 2010; Jensen et al., 2003; Owen-Smith and Powell, 
2001). Once the invention disclosure occurs, the TTO is involved in every step until the 
license agreement is signed. 
After a new disclosure is made to the TTO, its personnel must evaluate the potential 
and estimate the monetary value, or potential for return of the innovation (Siegel et al, 
2003b). For these steps to be successful, TTO staff must have a deep understanding of the 
industry and the potential licensees or buyers for the technology. Since patent 
applications are expensive and TTOs have limited resources for patenting (Kim, 2011), 
TTO personnel must evaluate whether the potential revenues from a technology exceed 
the patent investment (Shane, 2004; Siegel et al., 2004). As global patent protection is 
very expensive (Siegel et al., 2004), TTOs frequently file for a provisional patent and test 
its marketability (Jensen and Thursby, 2001), or limit submission to a domestic patent 
application (Siegel and Phan, 2005). 
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Once the patent application has been filed, the TTO immediately starts to market the 
technology (Siegel and Phan, 2005). Markman et al. (2005) reported that the faster a TTO 
can commercialise patent-protected technologies, the greater the licensing revenues 
streams will be. According to their study, speed is influenced by the TTOs resources and 
structure, their knowledge of the industry in the particular field and faculty involvement 
throughout the process. Marketing of technologies becomes even more important if the 
university does not have a tier one reputation, as companies and entrepreneurs pay less 
attention to its IP portfolio (Siegel et al., 2004). 
From an information economics perspective (Nelson, 1959; Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990) firms are better informed about market opportunities, which results in information 
asymmetry in technology licensing markets (Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993). In fact, 
universities are typically poorly informed about markets in general and face an  
adverse selection problem: the potential licensee may claim that a patent has a  
low commercial value to obtain it at a low price (Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo, 
2010). If the university is better informed than the firm about the value of an innovation, 
it can use royalties to signal its value (Gallini and Wright, 1990; Macho-Stadler and 
Pérez-Castrillo, 1991). Under fixed payment agreements, the TTO receives the money up 
front, independently of the firms revenues, while under variable payment agreements 
(e.g., royalty) the amount depends on the firms productivity. Hence, the use of  
royalty licensing signals a high-quality innovation (Bercovitz and Feldmann, 2006; 
Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo, 2010). In order to mitigate the impact of information 
asymmetry, some licensing strategies combine fixed and variable payments to favour risk 
sharing between the two parties (Lowe, 2006). 
Traditionally, for the university, licensing revenue is tracked as one of the most 
important outputs of the UITT process and one of the central goals of its TTO (Jensen 
and Thursby, 2001; Association of University Technology Managers, 2014). TTOs apply 
a wide range of strategies to achieve this result. While some TTOs focus on transferring 
more knowledge and IP to the industry, other focus their resources to commercialise few 
homerun technologies (Litan et al., 2007), which promise high returns within a short 
amount of time and are usually licensed or sold to high technology industries (Lerner, 
2005). Licensing success, in the end, heavily depends on the TTOs communicating with 
inventors and the capabilities of the TTO staff to accurately estimate the value and 
market potential of an invention. 
The third activity of some TTOs is the initiation of collaborative research projects 
(Bercovitz et al., 2001). Collaborative research, sometimes called sponsored research, is a 
form of university-industry partnership that is becoming more relevant, especially as 
universities face decreasing government research funding (Santoro, 2000; Kealey and 
Nelson, 1996). Companies are engaging in UITT in an earlier stage, pre-licensing and 
funding R&D projects in university laboratories. As Santoro (2000) points out, the 
complexity of new technologies and the pace of new innovations increases companies 
interest in engaging in the early stages of the innovation and technology development 
process. Lee (2000) reported that these relationships are mutually beneficial, as firms 
benefit from an increased access to new discoveries and innovations and faculty members 
benefit from increasing their research funds for graduate students and laboratory 
equipment and by gaining insight into the application of their research and market pull 
for their technologies. 
Additional technology transfer channels have emerged recently in the UITT literature. 
We include two of them, namely academic consulting (Bercovitz and Feldman, 2006; 
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Cohen et al., 2002) and academic entrepreneurship (Siegel et al., 2007; Wright et al., 
2007). Academic consulting can be defined as the provision of a service by academics to 
external organisations on commercial terms. This may involve providing advice, 
resolving technical problems, as well as generating or testing new ideas. Consulting is 
usually provided individually by academics (Perkmann and Walsh, 2008). Universities 
worldwide often encourage their faculty to get involved in consulting activities, allowing 
them to commit a percentage of their regular work hours to the activity (Schmoch, 1999). 
Perkmann and Walsh (2008) define three types of academic consulting: opportunity-
driven, motivated by additional income; commercialisation-driven, motivated by 
technology development; and research driven, motivated by new research opportunities. 
Most commonly, consulting agreements are reached as the result of personal relationships 
and the reputation of the researcher. In an expanded view of the TTO, this activity can 
serve as a facilitator, bringing companies and faculty together. 
Academic entrepreneurship has observed significant growth over the past few years. 
The term itself has even become a buzzword for different kinds of entrepreneurial 
activities (Siegel, 2013). If the value or potential of a technology is unclear, academic 
entrepreneurship can be an effective approach to commercialisation (Baycan and Stough, 
2013). Entrepreneurship in this context includes the creation of start-ups and spin-offs 
from the university, often targeted at bridging the gap between research and market and 
focused heavily on technological risk reduction activities funded by private sources. 
Bradley et al. (2013) define start-ups as companies created by licensing an early-stage 
invention to an independent entrepreneur (who is not necessarily a faculty member), with 
the goal of developing the company around the growth and commercialisation of the 
technology. Spin-offs, on the other hand, are new companies formed by individuals 
(faculty members) related to the university or university research park to develop a 
technology that was discovered in and is transferred from, the parent organisation 
(Bradley et al., 2013). Siegel et al. (2003c) found that the research productivity of 
companies within a university research park is higher, compared to companies outside. 
Geographical proximity of the park to university is also an important factor (Link and 
Scott, 2005). A crucial success factor for spin-offs is the support from the university and 
its researchers (Steffensen et al., 2000). 
Entrepreneurial activities supported by students can also be considered academic 
entrepreneurship. Beyond profit maximisation, academic entrepreneurship pursues 
technology development, public service, economic development and peer-recognition, 
among other goals (Hayter, 2011). 
A TTO by definition plays a role in technology-based economic development, 
especially in light of technology licenses to regionally-based companies. Furthermore, 
TTOs can significantly contribute to the development of academic entrepreneurship. 
Through its wide network of contacts and relying on its expertise in different industries, a 
TTO can bring together researchers, venture capitalists, advisors and managers (OShea 
et al., 2005). Unfortunately, most TTOs are focused on supporting contractual relations 
and protecting their IP, rather than seeking involvement in entrepreneurial activities 
(Clarysse et al., 2011). They follow the traditional linear model of technology transfer, 
attending to a narrow view of the process, aiming to maximise short-term revenue. This 
approach, as we demonstrate using system dynamics, is inadequate due to secondary 
system elements that impact technology commercialisation outcomes arising from the 
inherent system complexity of stakeholder theory not captured in a linear model (Hill and 
Jones, 1992). 
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3 System dynamics modelling 
Forrester (1961, p.8) noted that managing is the task of designing and controlling an 
industrial system. Management science, if it is to be useful, must evolve effective 
methods to analyse the principal interactions among all the important components of a 
company and its external environment. Among a variety of modelling methods, system 
dynamics remains popular as an interdisciplinary approach used to understand complex, 
dynamic systems. It is designed to help managers and policy makers deal with changing 
environments and complex information feedback structures (Sterman, 2000). Key 
elements of system dynamics are an endogenous point of view and feedback thinking 
(Richardson, 2011). Forrester (1968, pp.42) explained that in concept a feedback 
system is a closed system. Its dynamic behaviour arises within its internal structure. Any 
action which is essential to the behaviour of the mode being investigated must be 
included inside the system boundary. This means that feedback loops are really a 
consequence of the endogenous point of view (Richardson, 2011), but also enable the 
endogenous point of view and give it structure (Richardson, 1999). 
System dynamics models can be illustrated by using stock and flow diagrams (or 
simple flow diagrams) or causal loop diagrams (Pidd, 2004). The terms causal loop 
diagrams and influence diagrams are sometimes used interchangeably. However, 
Coyle (1996) explains that even though both diagrams are similar, causal loop diagrams 
do not include as much details as influence diagrams. One example of the greater level of 
detail is the distinction between process flows and information flows in influence 
diagrams. Forrester (1961) introduced the fundamental ideas of stock and flow diagrams, 
required for quantitative simulation. They are often based on influence diagrams or 
causal loop diagrams (Coyle, 1998). According to Wolstenholme (1990, p.4), qualitative 
system dynamics can be characterised as a process: 
x to create and examine feedback loop structure of systems using resource flows, 
represented by level and rate variables and information flows, represented by 
auxiliary variables 
x to provide a qualitative assessment of the relationships between system processes 
(including delays), information, organisational boundaries and strategy 
x to estimate system behaviour and to postulate strategy design changes to improve 
behaviour. 
In the course of this paper, we employ system dynamics theories in modelling the 
relationships in the UITT process. Such a theoretical approach aims to develop simplified 
models of reality (Coyle, 1998) to allow people to think through their own positions and 
to engage in debate with others about possible action [Pidd, (2009), p.84]. 
Influence diagrams (or causal loop diagrams; see Figure 2) are used to illustrate 
hypotheses or a general overview of a system by creating balancing and reinforcing loops 
(Parunak et al., 1998). They describe variables and their relationships by linking them 
with arrows. Each relationship is marked with either a positive or a negative polarity, 
which is an indicator of the influence of one variable on another (Sterman, 2000). As 
shown in Figure 2, entirely positive loops are reinforcing loops (marked with an R), 
resulting in system gain, whereas loops with an odd number of negative relationships 
between two variables are called balancing loops (marked with a B), resulting in system 
attenuation. Solid arrows symbolise physical flows, whereas dotted lines represent 
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information or actions (Coyle, 1996). We apply this thinking to gain a more 
comprehensive understanding of the UITT process. 
Figure 2 Example of an influence diagram (see online version for colours) 
 
Source: Pidd (2004) 
4 A systems perspective for TTOs 
The traditional linear model of university technology transfer has various limitations and 
inaccuracies. It oversimplifies the process with a one-size-fits-all approach, places 
excessive emphasis on patents and fails to account for information mechanisms essential 
to technology transfer (Bradley et al., 2013). Implicit processes such as the building of a 
universitys technology transfer reputation are also missing in the traditional linear 
model. The four main technology transfer channels described in Section 2: licensing, 
collaborative research, academic entrepreneurship and consulting, are modelled and 
investigated in this section. We focus on the process, analysing the impact of licensing 
terms and industrys perceptions and ultimately the impact on the university. 
4.1 Licensing 
Bercovitz and Feldmann (2006) define licenses in UITT as the legal rights to use a 
specific piece of university intellectual property. The general university-industry 
technology licensing process has four steps: invention disclosure, patent award, license 
negotiation and payback to the university according to the license agreement (Carlsson 
and Fridh, 2002; Chapple et al., 2005; Rogers et al., 2001; Siegel et al., 2003a; Thursby 
and Kemp, 2002). This process is illustrated in Figure 3. 
The steps of the licensing process we contemplate in our systems model are the same 
as in the traditional linear model (Anderson et al., 2007; Bradley et al., 2013; Siegel et al., 
2003a). As a variable, University R&D represents the research that is performed at a 
university in terms of dollar amount allocated in the university budget. The more money 
a university spends on R&D, the more patents it will generate and disclosures mediate 
this process. The system dynamics model does not value the quality of disclosures or 
patents, so homerun technologies are treated like a standard technology in this first 
order model. Based on the results of the model development, a spectrum of technologies 
could be developed based on the quality of the technology, but is not addressed in this 
paper. 
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Figure 3 Influence diagram for university-industry licensing (see online version for colours) 
 
Issued patents are marketed by the TTO, leading to a certain amount of licenses. The 
number of licenses executed is not only a function of the number of patents, but also of 
the goodness of terms. The TTO and the licensee have disparate information about the 
value and commercialisation potential of the technology (Abramo et al., 2009; 
Vishwasrao, 1994). This information asymmetry accentuates the role the licensing terms 
play in the outcome of the negotiation (Gallini and Wright, 1990; Macho-Stadler and 
Pérez-Castrillo, 1991, 2010). The goodness of terms variable conceptually incorporates 
the licensing terms, such as royalty rates and milestone payments and the manner in 
which the TTO treats its industry partners during the licensing process. An increase in 
this variable means that the terms are becoming desirable from the perspective of the 
industry partner, leading to more successful negotiations and greater number of licenses 
executed. We should highlight that these are all nonlinear processes, which means that a 
detailed prediction of the systems behaviour is impossible solely based on its qualitative 
study. 
Not all licenses will lead to a commercially successful product or service. In the US, 
the success rate is about 44% based on a ten year-average (Association of University 
Technology Managers, 2012). Again, we postulate that these behaviours are subject to 
scale within the system boundaries. The successful licenses will lead to a return to the 
university, feeding into the university budget, a part of which will feed into the university 
R&D budget. This represents the reinforcing feedback loop R1. Better goodness of terms 
increases the licensing rate, but on the other hand lowers the return per license due to 
relaxed licensing terms. This is modelled using a negative relationship. 
In this section, we only evaluate licensing to an established company. Licensing to an 
entrepreneur is considered academic entrepreneurship and will be covered in Section 4.3. 
The university may increase revenue through royalties and fees, or receive equity in the 
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company as the payment. Instead of licensing technologies, the TTO can also sell the 
patent rights to a company or an entrepreneur. Thus a portion of patents becomes sold 
patents and as previously explained for successful licenses, not all sold patents are 
commercially successful patents for the buyer. However, an increasing number of sold 
patents will lead to a greater amount of successful patents. The difference to the process 
on licenses is that the sold patents feed back into the university budget, because the buyer 
takes on the risk whether the technology is successful or not. This represents the 
reinforcing feedback loops R2. 
As mentioned in Section 2, prestigious universities attract more corporate interactions 
(Siegel et al., 2004). We include this effect in our model via the variable R&D reputation. 
Sine et al. (2003) state that institutional prestige can be used to explain the number of 
licenses that exceed the number predicted by past performance and thus individual 
university heterogeneity. This leads to the postulate that there is a second type of 
reputation to consider, which is determined by the industry perception of university 
technology transfer activities, which we name the TT reputation. Siegel et al. (2003a) 
identified that 80% of company executives or entrepreneurs found that universities are 
too aggressive in exercising their IP rights. However, according to the same study, only 
13.3% of the TTO directors and administrators think that they are too aggressive. This 
leads us to define a positive link between goodness of terms and TT reputation. Together, 
these two variables positively feed into the university brand value. This variable 
represents the overall value of the name and the prestige of a particular university from 
an innovation perspective. The R&D reputation variable does not reflect any technology 
transfer activities and it is solely it is only influenced by the university R&D. On the other 
hand, the TT reputation is determined by the historical performance (successful licenses 
and successful patents) and the perceived current performance of the TTO, the goodness 
of terms. 
With no limitation to any particular geographic region or industry, we codify three 
categories of firms as they relate to the UITT process: the total pool, or total number of 
firms (Pt); the pool of firms that are interested in technology transfer with universities 
(Pw), no matter if they are currently participating in the UITT process or not; and the 
pool of firms that actively participate in some form technology transfer with one or more 
universities (Pd). The relationship between the three pools is one of subsets, with the size 
of the pools Pd < Pw < Pt, as shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4 Categorisation of companies (not proportional) (see online version for colours) 
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In a survey of members of the Licensing Executives Society (LES) in the US and Canada, 
Thursby and Thursby (2001) found that nearly half of the companies that responded 
ranked personal contacts between their R&D staff and university personnel as extremely 
important. Yet less than 10% indicated that it was extremely important to them that their 
licensing staff routinely canvass universities for new technologies. This suggests that, 
while UITT is important for companies, much of the onus for disseminating knowledge 
about IP and building relationships rests with the TTOs. We postulate that universities 
can increase the likelihood of successful licensing negotiations by maintaining good 
relationships with industry, especially via fair goodness of terms. Furthermore, the 
number of companies attracted to willingly enter into a licensing deal with a university 
can be increased (i.e., an increase of Pw). To quantify this effect, we created the variable 
pool of firms, which is mainly influenced by the university brand value. 
The university brand value (as well as the preceding TT reputation and R&D 
reputation on their own) and the pool of firms have to be treated as an asset to the 
university because they lead to competitive advantage (Prahalad, 1993; Wernerfelt, 
1984). According to the VRIO framework to evaluate organisational resources (Barney, 
1991, 1995), in order to lead to a competitive advantage, a resource has to be valuable, 
rare, costly to imitate and the firm has to be organised to capture the value of the 
resources. The four intangible assets we have identified meet the first three criteria. It 
takes a long time to build brand value and partnerships with industry. Due to the effort 
required in creating and maintaining successful partnerships, they are rare and costly to 
imitate. Thus to help set a university apart from others, the crucial point is to design the 
TTO organisation in a way to capture the value of these resources. By including these 
variables and the associated information flows, we generate more interrelations and the 
additional reinforcing feedback loops R3, R4, R5 and R6. These will be investigated in 
more detail in Section 5. 
4.2 Collaborative research 
Collaborative (or sponsored) research has been known for years as a means for the 
creation of new knowledge and IP (Steensma, 1996). There is a distinction between 
university R&D and collaborative research as it pertains to IP ownership. In terms of 
collaborative R&D, the IP is usually owned by the industrial partner, or jointly and not 
available for commercialisation through the university (Jelinek and Markham, 2007). 
The amount of collaborative research performed depends mainly on the pool of firms, 
which already reflects the university brand value and is an indicator of how attractive the 
university is and how well it is linked to industry and the goodness of terms. The better 
the terms offered by the university, the higher the probability that a contract will be 
signed and a collaboration will be started. For a university scientist, this has advantages 
over licensing revenue. The money goes directly into the research budget and the scientist 
are funded to conduct the research in a planned manner, instead of hoping on future 
royalty streams, which are less stable and predictable (Lee, 2000). 
Collaborative research affects the TT reputation because it requires technology 
transfer between the university and a non-academic partner. It also affects the R&D 
reputation, because even if the innovations cannot be commercialised, it does increase 
the amount of research performed at the university, thus leading to more publications, 
presentations and articles that create more awareness in industry. Figure 5 shows two 
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reinforcing loops related to these relationships, namely R7, capturing the impact of the 
TT reputation and R8, capturing the impact of the R&D reputation. 
Figure 5 Influence diagram for collaborative research (see online version for colours) 
 
4.3 Academic entrepreneurship 
A common type of academic entrepreneurship consists of licensing a technology to an 
independent entrepreneur. The process is very similar to the one described in Section 4.1, 
namely university R&D leads to disclosures and some of them become patents. In this 
process, patents will be licensed to a university start-up, generating returns, which feed 
back into the university budget to increase university R&D. This constitutes reinforcing 
loop R9. As in previous processes, the TTO can influence this loop via the goodness of 
terms. Better terms positively affect the number of university start-ups, but result in 
lower returns per start-up. 
There are two additional types of academic entrepreneurship, namely spin-offs from 
research parks (Löfsten and Lindelöf, 2002; Siegel et al., 2003c; Vedovello, 1997) and 
start-ups supported through incubators (Rasmussen et al., 2006). The latter is often 
associated with universities but not restricted to students (Wiggins and Gibson, 2003). 
Both can be financed, either wholly or partially through the university budget. Both 
student start-ups and spin-offs do not necessarily lead to direct returns and the TTO is not 
always involved in the management, process and policy design of these institutions. 
The addition of industry perceptions (i.e., TT reputation, R&D reputation) and 
associated information flows (e.g., flow affecting university brand value) increases the 
number of feedback loops. There is a direct reinforcing mechanism between university 
start-ups and the pool of firms (R10) as well as a broader feedback structure via an 
increase in R&D reputation due to increasing university R&D activities (R11). Additional 
feedback loops appear for student start-ups through the TT reputation (R12) and directly 
via the pool of firms (R13); for spin-offs via the TT reputation (R14) and the pool of 
firms (R15); and for the Research Park via the R&D reputation (R16). We will discuss 
these loops further in Section 5. 
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Figure 6 Influence diagram for academic entrepreneurship (see online version for colours) 
 
4.4 Consulting 
Top research universities pride themselves on the reputation their faculty have as 
scientists at the cutting edge of their field and as invaluable sources of information and 
advice for companies. Firms, in turn, seek short-term support from highly qualified and 
reputable consultants, many times from universities (Perkmann and Walsh, 2008). In our 
systems dynamics model, the consulting variable, as well as the collaborative research 
variable, is dependent on the pool of firms. 
Figure 7 Influence diagram for consulting (see online version for colours) 
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The returns from consulting, at least partially, feed back into the university budget and 
can be reinvested in university R&D, under the premise that the academic consultant is 
not running a consulting firm on the side. In addition, their work impacts the TT 
reputation via positive industry experience with a faculty member. An extension to this 
model should incorporate faculty incentives. Frequently, university policies encourage 
private consulting agreements. Similarly to the collaborative research model, Figure 7 
shows two reinforcing loops, R18 that captures the impact of the TT reputation and R17 
that captures the impact of the R&D reputation. 
5 Findings 
The previous sections have explored and modelled four technology transfer channels 
between universities (i.e., their TTOs) and industry. Taking as a point of departure the 
traditional linear model of technology transfer (Bradley et al., 2013; Harmon et al., 1997), 
we have built an expanded model incorporating the four channels and their connection to 
industry perceptions. Table 1 provides an overview of the identified feedback loops that 
require special attention from a methodological point of view (Wolstenholme, 1990). We 
demonstrate with this overview that the TTO has at least a point of direct influence 
within each feedback loop. In most cases, feedback loops also include the variables 
capturing the industry perceptions of the TTO. 
Table 1 Overview of feedback loops 
Loop Name Variables Influenced by TTO 
R1 Licensing 
process 
University R&D, disclosures, 
patents, licenses, successful 
licenses, returns, university 
budget 
Direct (goodness of terms) and 
medium (direct and indirect via 
pool of firms) 
R2 Selling 
process 
University R&D, disclosures, 
patents, sold patents, successful 
patents, returns, university 
budget 
Direct (goodness of terms) and 
medium (direct and indirect via 
pool of firms) 
R3 TT rep 
licensing 
Licenses, successful licenses, TT 
reputation, university brand 
value, pool of firms 
Direct (goodness of terms) and 
strong (direct and UBV and pool 
of firms are part of the loop) 
R4 R&D rep 
licensing 
University R&D, R&D 
reputation, university brand 
value, pool of firms, licenses, 
successful licenses, returns, 
university budget 
Direct (goodness of terms) and 
strong (direct and pool of firms is 
part of the loop) 
R5 TT rep 
selling 
Sold patents, successful patents, 
TT reputation, university brand 
value, pool of firms 
Direct (goodness of terms) and 
strong (direct and UBV and pool 
of firms are part of the loop) 
R6 R&D rep 
selling 
University R&D, R&D 
reputation, university brand 
value, pool of firms, sold patents, 
returns, university budget 
Direct (goodness of terms) and 
strong (direct and UBV and pool 
of firms are part of the loop) 
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Table 1 Overview of feedback loops (continued) 
Loop Name Variables Influenced by TTO 
R7 TT rep 
collaborating 
Collaborative research, TT 
reputation, university brand 
value, pool of firms 
Direct (goodness of terms) and 
strong (direct and UBV and pool 
of firms are part of the loop) 
R8 R&D rep 
collaborating 
Collaborative research, R&D 
reputation, university brand 
value, pool of firms 
Direct (goodness of terms) and 
strong (direct and UBV and pool 
of firms are part of the loop) 
R9 U start-up 
process 
University R&D, disclosures, 
patents, university spin-offs, 
returns, university budget 
Direct (goodness of terms) and 
medium (direct and indirect via 
pool of firms) 
R10 Reinforcing 
U start-up 
University start-ups, pool of 
firms 
Direct (goodness of terms) and 
strong (direct and pool of firms 
are part of the loop) 
R11 R&D rep U 
start-up 
University R&D, R&D 
reputation, university brand 
value, pool o firms, university 
start-ups, returns, university 
budget 
Direct (goodness of terms) and 
strong (direct and UBV and pool 
of firms are part of the loop) 
R12 TT rep S 
start-up 
University budget, university 
incubator, student start-ups, TT 
reputation, university brand 
value, pool of firms, university 
start-ups, returns 
Direct (goodness of terms) and 
strong (direct and UBV and pool 
of firms are part of the loop) 
R13 Pool S  
start-up 
University budget, university 
incubator, student start-ups, pool 
of firms, university start-ups, 
returns 
Direct (goodness of terms) and 
strong (direct and pool of firms 
are part of the loop) 
R14 TT rep spin-
off 
University budget, research park, 
spin-offs, TT reputation, 
university brand value, pool of 
firms, university start-ups, 
returns 
Direct (goodness of terms) and 
strong (direct and UBV and pool 
of firms are part of the loop) 
R15 Pool spin-off University budget, research park, 
spin-offs, pool of firms, 
university start-ups, returns 
Direct (goodness of terms) and 
strong (direct and UBV and pool 
of firms are part of the loop) 
R16 R&D rep 
research park 
University budget, research park, 
R&D reputation, university 
brand value, pool of firms, 
university start-ups, returns 
Direct (goodness of terms) and 
strong (direct and UBV and pool 
of firms are part of the loop) 
R17 TT rep 
consulting 
Consulting, TT reputation, 
university brand value, pool of 
firms 
Direct (goodness of terms) and 
strong (direct and UBV and pool 
of firms are part of the loop) 
R18 R&D rep 
consulting 
Consulting, university budget, 
university R&D, R&D 
reputation, university brand 
value, pool of firms 
Direct (goodness of terms) and 
strong (direct and UBV and pool 
of firms are part of the loop) 
However, if we exclude the industry perception, the number of feedback loops in the 
model decreases to three, as the TTO would revert to primarily focus on direct revenue 
generation. This would limit its focus on the four intangible assets identified and shorten 
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its planning horizon. Attending to the findings reported by Siegel et al. (2004) and Sine  
et al. (2003), shunning industry perception would be an act of negligence on the part of 
the university. Figure 8 combines the four models into one unified model, providing a 
holistic view of the UITT process from the perspective of the TTO. In this more complex 
model (Figure 8), the impacts of the goodness of terms, the TT reputation and the pool of 
firms stand out as pivotal for the success of a TTO and a university technology transfer 
process. 
Figure 8 Influence diagram for comprehensive UITT model (see online version for colours) 
 
The various technology transfer channels are tied together through these constructs. TTO 
managers have to take these factors into consideration in order to improve their processes 
and policies. The fact that these technology transfer channels are tied together leads to the 
inevitable conclusion that a TTO needs a well-defined overall technology transfer 
strategy as the baseline for the design of more specific policies and processes. The system 
dynamics perspective indicates that, due to the interconnection of different technology 
transfer channels, it is impossible to achieve optimal returns to the university without an 
overall UITT strategy. 
Because the university brand value and the pool of firms are part of many feedback 
loops and the TTO influences these via the perceived goodness of terms, a relaxation of 
terms and policies that encourage greater industry interaction, less bureaucracy and 
simpler processes should be evaluated. Although relaxing goodness of terms may harm 
short-term profits, in the long run it may result in a better revenue position for the 
university. A growth in the pool of firms and other revenue channels such as 
collaborative research, consulting and academic entrepreneurship will give the 
university a competitive advantage when competing for research funding and industry 
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partnerships. Another (unintended) consequence we identify with this theoretical model 
is the fostering of economic growth through innovation and job creation due to increased 
entrepreneurial activities within the universitys regional business ecosystem. 
6 Discussion 
As Bradley et al. (2013) anticipated, the traditional linear technology transfer process is 
outdated and includes too many shortcomings and inaccuracies. The overemphasis on 
patents and licensing will not lead to optimal returns for university TTOs. By modelling 
additional technology transfer and potential revenue channels, we have conceived a 
broader inclusive theoretical model that can allow for developing a more strategic 
framework for university TTOs. The application of systems dynamic theory (Forrester, 
2007) permits the shift from the traditional revenue-maximisation focus to a 
comprehensive understanding of the dynamics leading to successful UITT. Our model 
contributes a broader theoretical perspective, attending to implicit and explicit 
interactions between the process stakeholders (Hill and Jones, 1992) and accounting for 
perceptions of universities technology transfer reputation, all of which are currently 
lacking in linear models. 
The most successful universities in terms of start-up activity set themselves apart by 
having a well-defined strategy and using external entrepreneurs, rather than academic 
entrepreneurs (Lockett et al., 2003). However, this strategy inherently goes beyond the 
boundaries of the TTO or requires a redefinition of the roles and responsibilities of a 
university TTO. And there are additional issues that should concern the TTO but are 
beyond its oversight. Academic scientists, especially those without tenure, are under a lot 
of pressure to publish their ideas and innovations. Following the tenure policies of their 
universities, they publish in certain research journals or give presentations at leading 
conferences. They strive for peer recognition and a growing academic network (Siegel  
et al., 2007). Policies have to give credit for faculty involvement in technology transfer 
activities and compensate the possible publication delays caused by industry partnerships 
resulting in work that is undergoing patent applications. Commonly, these decisions are 
out of the control range of the TTO management, but rather rest with the academic 
leadership of the university. 
Another aspect worth mentioning is the innovation ecosystem and the local 
entrepreneurial culture in which a university is embedded. Successful entrepreneurial 
regions, such as Silicon Valley or the Boston area, are not only characterised by a great 
availability of venture capital, but also by supporting institutions, formal and informal 
networks, as well as mentoring. Technology transfer opportunities emerge from these 
networks at a much greater rate than stand-alone university campuses. In particular, 
informal networks have been recognised as very important (Siegel et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, the culture can affect the type of commercialisation route chosen and can 
foster entrepreneurship. The university cannot change the entrepreneurial climate or build 
this entire infrastructure on its own, but it plays an important role in enabling it. This 
outlines the bigger picture that TTOs can use to evaluate policies during the development 
and implementation phases based on their regions entrepreneurial maturity. 
There are also challenges the TTO faces on its own. Even though relaxing licensing 
terms would improve its reputation, the TTO must ensure a revenue stream for the 
university. In line with their overall strategy, TTOs need to strike a balance between 
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lowering barriers with better IP licensing terms and policies on the one hand and getting 
adequate compensation for promising technologies on the other hand. Despite the 
forthright appeal of the resource-based approach, the TTO has to ensure that the 
organisation is structured in a way that permits realising the value of intangible assets 
(Barney, 1991; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Wernerfelt, 1984). 
TTOs need to be involved in more than just disclosing, patenting and licensing 
innovations if they are to help universities expand the impact of the UITT process. 
University executives and TTO managers cannot ignore the interconnections among 
technology transfer channels and factors such as goodness of terms, TT reputation and 
pool of firms if they aim to improve their processes and policies. TTOs interested in 
incorporating the proposed systems dynamics model into the technology licensing and 
commercialisation strategies should evaluate their current licensing model and quantify 
their level of those elements of the model not considered on their strategy (e.g., their TT 
reputation or university brand value). They should identify objectives aimed to boosting 
their reputation (e.g., via sponsored research), the size of the pool of firms and the 
goodness of terms, identifying and analysing adequate metrics. Finally, TTOs should act 
on those elements of the model under their purview (e.g., creation of student start-ups, 
goodness of licensing terms) to foster the evolution of their policies and operations in the 
desired direction. 
7 Conclusions and further research 
This paper marks a major step in theory development and modelling of the UITT process. 
Using a qualitative system dynamics approach, we provide a theoretical model that 
exemplifies the inherent complexity of the UITT process, a step forward from the 
empirical surveys that have been performed in this area. Our systems dynamics model 
shows that a technology transfer approach using the linear model yields a focus on  
short-term revenue maximisation and suboptimal benefits for the university as it 
disregards crucial dynamic relations. Applying a resource-based view of the UITT 
process, we accounted for factors such as the university brand value, the TT reputation 
and the pool of firms, demonstrating that different technology transfer channels are 
tightly coupled and have to be evaluated in unison for improving UITT returns. The 
theory developed in this paper identifies implicit and explicit processes across multiple 
stakeholders affecting the UITT. This theory suggests that technology transfer research 
should abandon the linear, agent-centred, revenue maximisation approach in favour of a 
system dynamics approach, inclusive of all stakeholders and implicit processes. 
The theoretical model we present in this paper is not without limitations. Every model 
must have boundaries. External factors such as the market demand for a particular 
technology and rare events such as the case of disruptive homerun technologies have 
not been included in this first order model. Additionally, to exploit the power that system 
dynamics offers as a modelling technique for the UITT process, delays and time effects 
have to be taken into consideration. This is not only important for the secondary 
dynamics and the time lags, but also to evaluate timing of revenue streams for the 
university. Understanding when the effect might be measurable is just as important as the 
magnitude of the effect. Further limitations include factors not incorporated in the current 
model are the size of the university, the geographical proximity to industries and the 
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existence of an entrepreneurship-friendly ecosystem. These elements of the model may 
lead to more detailed inquiry as quantitative simulations are developed. 
The findings suggest that a broad strategic view of the UITT process can be a major 
driver of greater university returns and requires policies counter to short-term licensing 
revenue maximisation seen with a traditional linear model of technology transfer. While 
the policy choices may be clear with this model for improving university returns, the fact 
remains that the ownership of the policies may remain outside of the TTOs management 
sphere. In some universities they lie with business affairs, research, academic affairs, or 
other administrative units. As a result, successful policy changes may be difficult, 
especially if the TTO continues to be measured on traditional short-term metrics by 
university leadership. 
We are working towards an applied extension of this system dynamics model. One 
objective of this follow-on work will be to quantify the potential differences in returns to 
universities under differing policy regimes and attempt to optimise the returns based on 
changes to the main variables the TTO controls. A comparison between different 
universities from various regions will help evaluating political conditions, university 
strategies, as well as TTO policies and serve as case studies for validating the model. 
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